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Web-Based Investment Securities: Should Personal Stock-
baskets Be Subject to 1933 Act Registration?
The dawning of the Internet age, combined with a booming
economy, brought about a marked increase in direct investment by
individuals.1 Former commissioner of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), Steve Wallman, played a leading role in bringing
advanced technologies into the securities industry, and founded the
web-based investment company FOLIOfn in 1998. Wallman's
innovation, FOLIOfin, is an investment program designed to bring the
stock market to the rapidly diversifying pool of individual investors.
FOLIOfn describes its investment service as an alternative to
both individual stock picking and mutual funds.2 The company allows
an investor to invest in the stock market "without the complexities,
risks, and costs of building [a portfolio] one stock at a time."'3  A
"folio"4 is a group of publicly-traded stocks that can be purchased in a
single transaction using the FOLIOfn system.5 When an individual
invests in a folio, he has the ability to buy and sell up to fifty securities
in one transaction, place orders in dollar amounts rather than in share
amounts, trade without commission fees, and control tax expenditure
investment risks.6 FOLIOfn asserts that this method of investing
1. See Gaston F. Ceron, The Best Way to... Trade Stocks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1999,
at R32 (noting that 4.6 million online investors had traded at least once in the prior six
months). The number of online trading accounts increased from 15.9 million to 20.5
million (29%) during the period from the first quarter of 2000 to the first quarter of 2001
even as the NASDAQ index dipped sixty-eight percent. Dave Pettit, Still Clicking, WALL
ST. J., June 11, 2001, at R4.
2. FOLIOfn.com, Our Services: FOLIO Investing, at http://www.foliofn.com/
content/files/servicesjfolioinvesting.shtml (description FOLIOfn's investing system and
services) (last visited Aug. 22,2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
3. Id.
4. Folios are often called "stock-baskets" in other similar investment programs.
5. An investor chooses a "ready-to-go" folio, which consists of a prepared portfolio
of stocks, or he can build a folio from scratch. FOLIOfn.com, Learn More: What's a
Folio?, at http://www.foliofn.com/content/files/2.shtml (describing how to create and
administer a folio) (last visited Aug. 22, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). "Ready-to-go" folios, for example, may be composed of the DOW components,
the largest fifty companies of the S&P 500, or top technology companies. See, e.g., Karen
Damato, 'Personal Funds' May Challenge Industry, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2000, at C1
(stating that FOLIOfn provides seventy-five different ready to go folios); FOLIOfn.com,
Learn More: Overview, at http://vww.foliofn.com/contentlfiles/l.shtml (providing a full
list of "ready-to-go" folios) (last visited Aug. 22, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
6. See FOLIOfn.com, supra note 2; see also Stacy Forster, The Feeling's Mutual:
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provides all the advantages of individual stock and mutual fund
investing,7 while eliminating the disadvantages."
In September of 2000, the Investment Company Institute (ICI)9
submitted a memorandum to the SEC regarding the legality of
FOLIOfn under federal securities law."° In this memo, the ICI argues
that FOLIOfn is "issuing, offering, and selling securities separate
from the underlying securities in investors' portfolios"" that have not
been registered as required by the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act).12
The ICI's challenge to FOLIOfn and similar web-based investment
vehicles is significant not only because of its members' market power
New Services Let Investors Manage Their Own Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2001,
at R28 (giving a general description of FOLIOfn and similar online investment services).
7. The advantages of mutual fund investing include diversification and simplicity.
See FOLIOfn.com, Learn More: Why Folios Are Better Than Mutual Funds, at
http:/lwww.foliofn.comlcontent/files/3cl.shtml (last visited Aug. 22, 2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). The advantages of stock investing include tax management
and corporate voting rights. See Patrick McGeehan, The Unmutual Fund The Iconoclast
Says He Has a Better Idea for Individuals, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2000, at Cl;
FOLIOfn.com, Learn More: Why Folios Are a Better Way To Own Stocks, at
http://www.foliofn.com/content/files/3bl.shtml (last visited Aug. 22, 2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
8. The disadvantages of stock ownership, according to FOLIOfn, are the expense
required to diversify, the fees per trade, and the inability to invest in dollar amounts. See
FOLIOfn.com, Learn More: Why Folios Are a Better Way to Own Stocks, at
http://wwv.foliofn.comlcontentlfiles/3b3.shtml (last visited Aug. 22, 2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). The disadvantages of mutual fund ownership, according to
FOLIOfn, are indirect ownership, no control over tax consequences, and percentage fees.
See FOLIOfn.com, Learn More: Why Folios Are Better Than Mutual Funds, at
http://www.foliofn.com/content/files/3c2.shtml (last visited Aug. 22,2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
9. The ICI represents investment companies that sell mutual funds, closed-end
funds, and unit investment trusts. It represents its members and their mutual fund
shareholders in matters of regulation and legislation. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE,
ABOUT THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, at http://www.ici.org/about-ici.html
(providing information on the ICI) (last visited Aug. 22, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
10. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, INSTITUTE COMMENTS ON WEB-BASED
INVESTMENT PROGRAMS, at http://www.ici.org/issues/portfolio_cvr.html (last visited on
Aug. 22, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter ICI
COMMENTS].
11. Id.
12. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 77a-77aa (West 1997 & Supp. 2001)). To register a security under federal law, the
security's offeror must file an appropriate registration statement with the SEC and pay a
fee. Id. § 77f. The registration statement discloses material information about the offered
security. Id. at § 77g; see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 115-16 (3d ed. 1996). The type of information disclosed and the particular
form used for the registration statement is dependent on the size and nature of the
offering. Id. at 116. None of FOLIOfn's "products" are registered under the 1933 Act.
ICI COMMENTS, supra note 10.
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in the financial world, but also because the ICI possesses the power to
affect financial regulation at the state and federal levels.13
The SEC's determination of whether FOLIOfn is offering a
security will have enormous ramifications. Web-based investment
has grown by leaps and bounds during the past few years and has
extended personal investing to a much larger group of individuals. 14
Other web-based companies are offering stock portfolios virtually
identical to those marketed by FOLIOfn.15 While the SEC might not
want to close the door on products that make investing available to
the common citizen, it may fear that a relaxed inquiry would open the
door to riskier products that could hurt the investing community.16
Although web-based products caught the ICI's attention only
recently, FOLIOfn was not the first company to sell stock-baskets as
individual investments. In 1989, Fidelity briefly offered stock-basket
investments.1 7 Fidelity discontinued offering stock-baskets because
they were not profitable, not because the securities laws threatened
this practice.ls The ICI's silence in 1989 raises the question of why it
is now taking a position against stock-baskets. One answer is that the
Internet has brought stock investment to a larger number of people.
The investors' ability to obtain easily diversified stock portfolios may
cause them to "fire" their fund managers and to run their own
portfolios. 9 Furthermore, personal-fund services, like FOLIOfn, may
call attention to other weaknesses of managed stock mutual funds.2°
13. See, e.g., Charles Gasparino, Mutual Funds Are Unlikely to Trim Fees, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 25, 1996, at C23 (reporting on the ICI's ability to convince Congress to end state
mutual fund regulation); Charles Gasparino, SEC Shelves Plan to List Money-Fund Data
Quarterly, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1995, at 19 (reporting that ICI pressure on the SEC
forced the commission to scrap regulations designed to let investors realize their mutual
fund holdings).
14. Ceron, supra note 1.
15. Many technology-based investment firms such as BuyandHold.com,
Sharebuilder.com, Netfolio.com, and Electronic Investment Corporation have plans to
offer similar products. Judith Burns, Fund Firms Worry About Web Products, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 11, 2000, at C25 (describing the mutual fund industry reaction to stock-basket
products). Offering stock-baskets will not be limited to Internet companies, however, as
both Fidelity Investments and Charles Schwab are in the process of offering stock-basket
portfolios. Damato, supra note 5.
16. See Memorandum from Investment Company Institute, to the Division of
Investment Management of the Securities Exchange Commission (July 12,2000), available
at http://wwwv.ici.org/portfoliocomattach.html [hereinafter ICI Memo] (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). t.N
17. Damato, supra note 5 (reporting that Fidelity will offer its customers stock-
baskets again, after discontinuing such products twelve years ago).
18. Id.
19. Id. (describing how stock-baskets differ from traditional mutual funds).
20. Id. John Bogle, founder of Vanguard Group, stated, "They are going to be a good
20011
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
While the ICI might legitimately fear the possibility that these
funds will hurt investors if they are not properly regulated, a more
significant reason for ICI's opposition is the negative impact of
competition on the mutual fund industry.21 The ICI has not accused
UNX, Inc., a company offering stock-basket trading to institutional
investors and financial advisors for more than a year, of violating SEC
registration requirements.' The ICI began to speak up only when
companies began to make stock-baskets available to individuals.
Although the ICI's memorandum to the SEC raised both liquidity
issues and possible needs for disclosure, an ICI spokesperson
conceded that one of its main concerns was FOLIOffn's ability to
avoid fee and advertising regulationsY It appears, therefore, that the
ICI would protect mutual funds to the disadvantage of investors.
Whereas the ICI's motivation might not totally discredit its argument
that stock-baskets are securities, this motive renders its arguments
questionable. The SEC should not feel pressured by the market
power of the ICI.
The first step in evaluating the ICI's arguments is to determine if
FOLIOfn sells investments fitting the definition of a "security."' 4
Section 2(a)(3) of the 1933 Act defines the term "security."' 5 In
addition to notes, stocks, bonds, and other investments that are
widely thought of as securities, the definition also includes
"investment contracts."26 In SEC v. W.J. Howey, Co., 7 the Supreme
Court defined an investment contract as a contract, transaction, or
scheme whereby a person: 1) invests his money, 2) in a common
enterprise, and 3) is led to expect profits, 4) solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party. 8 If an investment program meets these
four criteria, it is a security subject to the requirements of the 1933
Act.29
competitor and put pressure on costs in the mutual fund field." Id
21. Not all members of the mutual fund industry agree with the ICI. Fidelity, a major
mutual fund company, asserts that stock-baskets are not mutual funds and should not be
subject to mutual fund regulations. Id.
22 See id.
23. Burns, supra note 15; see also ICI Memo, supra note 16.




27. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
28. Id.
29. In Marine Bank v. Weaver, the Supreme Court added a further limiting
requirement to the Howey test: for an instrument to be a security, the investor must risk
loss. 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982). The Supreme Court held that a conventional certificate
[Vol. 80
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Despite the Supreme Court's articulation of what constitutes an
investment contract, it is very difficult to apply the Howey test to
FOLIOfn's investment program. The first and third elements of the
test are met because people invest money in folios and expect profits
from their investments. The common enterprise and promoter effort
elements of the test, however, present much closer questions.
The first question is whether FOLIOfn's efforts in supplying
stock-baskets for customers constitutes a common enterprise. The
circuit courts are split on the question of what relationship is
necessary to create a common enterprise. The circuit courts have
developed three distinct approaches to the common enterprise
question. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits hold that only
"horizontal commonality"3  creates a common enterprise.3'
Horizontal commonality requires a pooling of interests, usually
combined with a pro rata sharing of profits and losses.3 2  The Fifth
Circuit holds that broad "vertical commonality" 33 suffices, but not
necessarily to the exclusion of a horizontal commonality approach. 3
Vertical commonality requires only that the investor and promoter be
involved in a common venture without requiring that other investors
also be involved in the enterprise. The First, Second, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits hold that "strict vertical commonality"36 creates a
common enterprise, but not necessarily to the exclusion of horizontal
commonality.37 Strict vertical commonality means that the investor's
of deposit was not a security because federal banking regulations and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) eliminate all risk of loss to the investor. Id. at 558-59.
30. Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994).
31. See SEC v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 187-88 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 1228 (2001); Cooper v. King, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11296, at *5 (6th Cir. 1997)
(per curiam); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 887 (1972); see also HAZEN, supra note 12, at 33 (stating that horizontal
commonality clearly satisfies the Howey common enterprise requirement).
32- Revak, 18 F.3d at 87.
33. Id.
34. SEC v. Cont'l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1974). Broad
vertical commonality means that the success of the investment made is primarily
dependent on the efforts of the promoter. Id.
35. Revak, 18 F.3d at 87.
36. Id. at 88; see also Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459,461 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding
that a promoter furnishing investment counsel for a commission did not meet the common
enterprise test because there was no correlation between investor's success and promoter's
efforts). In Brodt, the court found that the promoter's weak efforts robbed the investor of
potential gains, but that did not necessarily mean the investor would suffer serious losses.
Id.
37. See Revak, 18 F.3d at 88; Villeneuve v. Advanced Bus. Concepts Corp., 698 F.2d
1121, 1124 (11th Cir. 1983), affd en banc, 730 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1984); Brodt, 595 F.2d
at 461 (9th Cir. 1978); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 638 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D. Mass.
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fortunes are tied directly to the promoter's fortunes.3 The Fourth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have not considered the issue.
To support a finding that FOLIOfn is offering a security, the ICI
argues that many of the shares are fractional, 9 requiring that trading
take place via the odd lot trading service,4" which bunches buy and
sell orders together.4 Therefore, FOLIOfn engages in horizontal
pooling by risking investors' combined trading capital during the
period of time between when orders are entered and when they are
actually executed.4"
FOLIOfin, however, is not clearly engaging in horizontal pooling,
as the ICI asserts. Profits and losses are not taken on a pro rata basis
as required for horizontal commonality.43 One investor might sell a
stock for a profit while another investor might sell a stock at a loss
even though they executed the trades at the same time.44 Even
though FOLIOfn's customers all use the odd-lot trading service,
having a common agent in the marketplace does not mean those
customers are pooling their assets. In Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., the
1985), affid, 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986).
38. Revak, 18 F.3d at 88; see also Brodt, 595 F.2d at 462 (holding promoter furnishing
investment counsel for a commission did not meet the common enterprise test because
there was no correlation between investor's success and promoter's efforts). In Brodt, the
court found that the promoter's weak efforts robbed the investor of potential gains but
that did not necessarily mean the investor would suffer serious losses. Id.
39. Folio investments are sold in dollar amounts rather than share amounts. Some
investors have interests that are only a portion of a whole share (i.e., one-third of a share
or five-and-four-fifths of a share).
40. FOLIOfn's "odd lot trading service," as it is dubbed by the ICI, tries to match buy
and sell orders of any particular stock together so that the trade can be made in-house
without going through a middleman. ICI Memo, supra note 16. Only when FOLIOfn's
computer system is unable to match orders for a particular stock will the orders be sent to
the market for ordinary execution. Id. FOLIOfn's founder believes that this method of
keeping trades in-house is the secret to profitability. McGeehan, supra note 7; see ICI
Memo, supra note 16.
41. ICI Memo, supra note 16. FOLIOfn also provides a market transaction service
for $14.95 per share. FOLIOfn fee schedule, available at http://www.foliofn.com/content/
education/costcalcfees.jsp (last visited Oct. 24, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). Market transactions do not help those that invested smaller dollar
amounts, however, because the fee may be larger than the value of the individual security
in their folio.
42. ICI Memo, supra note 16.
43. Revak, 18 F.3d at 87.
44. Stock prices are not constant, so one investor may profit on a sale while another
who bought at a higher price does not realize a gain on the sale.
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Second Circuit held that purchasers using the promoter's services
established a common agency, not a common enterprise.45
FOLIOfn's program presents a case similar to Revak.
FOLIOfn's customers are relying on FOLIOfn to serve as their agent
in the stock market. Even though investor trades are "pooled" at
execution, each investor's fortune does not necessarily depend on the
profitability of the enterprise as a whole.46  Rather, profitability
depends solely on the change in market price of the stocks comprising
an investor's folio-supporting a strong argument that no horizontal
commonality exists under FOLIOfn's scheme.47 Therefore, in the
Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, FOLIOfn may not be an
investment contract and thus not a security for 1933 Act purposes.
With respect to vertical commonality, the ICI argues that the
success of each folio depends on the investment management,
trading, marketing, technological efforts, and success of the FOLIOfn
program as a whole.48 If FOLIOfn's business is unsuccessful,
investors may be stuck with securities that have no value outside
FOLIOfn's unique program. The ICI fails to consider that
regulations put in place by the SEC protect investors from the
possible demise of their broker-dealer.4 9  Mutual funds have
additional characteristics that create a common enterprise: soliciting
contributors, commingling customer funds with each other, and
relying on investment expertise of the promoter to produce a profit.50
Current federal law enables investors to recoup their investments
when their broker-dealers become insolvent.5 1  Since investor
45. Revak, 18 F.3d at 88. Because there was no rent-pooling arrangement between
the investors, the court did not think that there was evidence of horizontal commonality.
It.
46. See id at 87.
47. In an action against an issuer of a security, the complaining party has the burden
of proving that the investment product offered is a security under the 1933 Act. Gary
Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 756 F.2d 230, 237 (2d
Cir. 1985). In an action against FOLIOfn charging that it is offering separate securities,
the complaining party will have to prove that folios are securities.
48. ICI Memo, supra note 16.
49. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-1, -2, -3 (2001); see also infra notes 66-84 and accompanying
text.
50. Subcommittee on Annual Review, Annual Review of Federal Securities
Regulation, 40 Bus. LAW. 159 (1984) (using these characteristics to establish that a group
deposit administration annuity was like a mutual fund); see also Peoria Union Stock Yards
Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 324 (7th Cir. 1983)
(noting that "[m]utual-fund shares are of course securities").
51. See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text; Securities Investors Protection Act
of 1970, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78aaa-78111 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001) (establishing the Securities
Investor Protections Corporation (SIPC) and the SIPC fund).
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interests are therefore protected and not linked to FOLIOfn's
success, there is no common enterprise created by a vertical
relationship. The broker-dealer regulations5 2 sufficiently disalign the
interest of investors to the promoter so that no common enterprise is
created.
Even assuming there is a common enterprise, courts face a
second question-whether investors profit from the efforts of
FOLIOfn. The Supreme Court's original formulation of the Howey
test required that the investor's profits derive "solely" from the
efforts of others.5 Since Howey, debate has ensued about whether to
define "solely" narrowly to mean that an investor can make no efforts
in the realization of profits, or more broadly so that an investor can
be somewhat involved as long as the main efforts behind the
investment are put forth by the promoter. 4 The SEC has noted that
in an investment contract, an investor may participate to a limited
degree in the operations of the business.5 Since Howey, ten circuits
have held that a broad definition of "solely from the efforts of others"
is appropriate 6.5  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has dropped the
word "solely" from its latest statement of the test, indicating that a
broad definition will probably be upheld, though the issue remains
unresolved. 7
The FOLIOfn program would not constitute a security under a
strict interpretation of this prong of the Howey test because investors
participate in the realization of profits by picking stocks, making
trades, and controlling the tax consequences of their folio
investments.5 8 But, because a broader interpretation will probably be
52. See infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
53. SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,298-99 (1946).
54. SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999); Bailey v.
J.W.K. Props., Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 920 n.3 (4th Cir. 1990); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter.
Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
55. Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and
Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, Securities Act Release
No. 5347, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,539, at 82,539 (Jan. 4,
1983).
56. Steinhardt Group v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1997); SEC v. Life
Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536,545 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Bailey, 904 F.2d at 920 n.3; Messer v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 833 F.2d 909, 916-17 (11th Cir. 1987); Meyer v. Dans un Jardin, S.A., 816
F.2d 533, 535 (10th Cir. 1987); Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 345 (5th Cir. 1986); SEC
v. Prof'l Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); SEC v. Aqua-Sonics Prods. Corp., 687
F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1982); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 408 n.59 (7th Cir. 1978);
Turner, 474 F.2d at 482 n.7.
57. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975) (commenting
on the Turner interpretation without discussing its validity).
58. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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upheld, it is necessary to consider whether FOLIOfn meets the more
liberal definition. The ICI argues that by providing the odd lot
trading service, FOLIOfin is extending the main efforts in realizing
profits for its investors.59 Because investors are dealing in small and
fractional shares, they would be unable to trade without FOLIOfn.
Since profits on stocks are realized at the time of sale,6I the
promoter's efforts are more important than the investor's efforts in
securing profits, according to the 10. Without the service,
FOLIOftn's customers cannot sell their stocks and realize any profits
on their own. In reality, without FOLIOffn's trading services,
investors in FOLIOfin products have no control. Furthermore, the
ICI argues that the investor's effort in choosing a basket is
fundamentally the same as choosing a mutual fund, which has been
held to be a security and subject to the 1933 Act.6'
One counter-argument to the ICI's position is that investing in a
folio is different than choosing a mutual fund because part of the
decision in choosing a mutual fund is selecting not only an investment
strategy but the supervising manager of the fund.62 Because mutual
fund holdings can change at any time without investor consultation,
the promoter puts forth greater effort, which supports a holding that
mutual funds are securities. This argument fails to acknowledge,
however, that FOLIOfin manages its customers' portfolio at a
different level. Whereas a mutual fund manager is responsible for
managing his fund,63 the FOLIOfn managers are responsible for
managing the entire FOLIOfn program: the website, the trading
service, and other day-to-day business operations.64
59. ICI Memo, supra note 16.
60. This is especially true in today's corporate structure, where many companies do
not pay or have reduced payments of stock dividends. Karen Hube, More Dividends Go
the Way of the Dinosaur, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2000, at R6. Many investors must sell
appreciated stock to make gains. See C. Frederic Wiegold, Dividends Are Less Popular
Among Young Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1999, at R10.
61. United States v. Faulhaber, 929 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
62. See Jonathan Clements, Getting the Most For Your Money: Does Your Stock
Fund Pass These Three Tests?, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1991, at Cl; see also 1 MATrHEw
BENDER, FEDERAL SECURITIEs Acr OF 1933 § 2.01(11)(c)(v) (A.A. Sommer, Jr. ed.,
2001) (discussing collective investment vehicles).
63. See Clements, supra note 62.
64. In executing a trade for a customer, FOLIOfn first will try to match orders with
other customers seeking to trade in the same security. If there is no match, FOLIOfn must
send the order to the market to complete the transaction. See FOLIOfn.com, FOLIO
forun: What's a Window Trade?, at http://www.foliofn.com/contentlforum/allabout/
article.000511jn.shtml (last visited Aug. 23, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
2001]
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In both situations, the success of the investment depends largely
on the ability of the manager to succeed in his job: stock picking for
the mutual fund manager and running the odd lot trading service for
the FOLIOfn manager. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that
even if an investor has a right to manage the investments in his
portfolio, if he is practically dependent on the expertise of another,
the promoter's efforts prong of the Howey test is met.65 FOLIOfn
will likely be seen as making the primary efforts in this investment
program. Whether FOLIOfn meets the promoter's efforts prong,
however, may depend on how it compares to other cases in which
courts have analyzed investment programs based on the requirements
of the Howey test.
Not all investments that fall within the definition of a "security"
under the 1933 Act fall under the regulations of the Act.66 When
another federal regulation adequately protects investors, it is
unnecessary to subject issuers to the federal securities laws.67 The
rationale is that agencies should avoid regulatory "double-coating" '
because no reason exists to justify subjecting issuers to the added
costs of 1933 Act registration when purchasers are already adequately
protected.69
The main issue raised in the ICI's memorandum to the SEC is
liquidity; the ability of investors to sell the assets in their folio for
cash.7" In the FOLIOfn's case, the market sets the value of the folio
through the prices of the underlying securities. FOLIOfn is unable to
affect theovalue of the underlying securities except by impacting the
demand for securities in general by increasing availability to
investors:" Because the market determines value here, the issue turns
on whether FOLIOfn presents investment risk in addition to those
risks already inherent in stock ownership.
Many of the risks that publicly traded stockholders face, in
addition to market uncertainty, arise because transactions are
65. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1460 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (citing
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,424-25 (5th Cir. 1981)).
66. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982) (stating that an instrument
that seems to fall under the 1933 Act is not to be considered a security if the context
otherwise requires).
67. Id.
68. Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 756
F.2d 230,241 (2d Cir. 1985) (providing context for the term "double coating" as a situation
where investors are already "abundantly protected" by another federal regulatory
scheme).
69. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 558-59.
70. In addition, the ICI is concerned about the possible failure of FOLIOfn as a
company. See ICI COMMENTS, supra note 10.
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affected using middlemen.71 Therefore, it is extremely important to
protect investors through regulation from possible broker
improprieties. FOLIOfn is such a registered broker-dealer. 72
Registered broker-dealers must comply with another set of SEC
regulations,73  including the SEC's customer protection rules,
examination rights, record-keeping standards, and various other
unwritten rules.74 Furthermore, registered broker-dealers are subject
to professional conduct codes, sales practice regulations, and
salesperson qualification provisions of self-regulatory organizations
(SROs)7 5 These extensive requirements serve as a tool to implement
and to enforce SEC regulations and to help further the policies set
forth by the 1933 and 1934 Acts.76
A primary function of the broker-dealer regulations is to help
secure the financial responsibility of broker-dealers. 71 Because
broker-dealers often maintain custody of the securities belonging to
their customers (a situation that is especially true at FOLIOfn), the
71. Using a middleman for market transactions poses additional risks because the
investor usually does not have physical possession of securities and the investor must rely
on the middleman to properly execute trades at the desired time for the desired price. See
infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. By requiring middlemen to effect securities
transactions, customers are also subject to improper broker-dealer activity such as
churning, excessive charging, high pressure sales tactics, and unsubstantiated
recommendations. HAZEN, supra note 12, at 515-20,463,510-12,501-03.
72. FOLIOfn is a registered broker-dealer with the SEC, all fifty states, and Puerto
Rico. See NASD Regulation, Inc., NASD Regulation Public Disclosure Program, at
http://www.nasdr.com/2000.htm (allowing an online search for registered broker-dealers)
(last visited Aug. 22, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). A broker-
dealer not only conducts transactions for others' accounts, but also buys and sells
securities for his own account. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (West 1997 & Supp. 2001)
(defining "broker" and "dealer"). In general, a broker-dealer must apply to the SEC and
receive approval, become a member of a self-regulatory organization (SRO) and the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), comply with state requirements, and
ensure that all associated persons satisfy the qualification requirements. See SECURITIES
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, COMPLIANCE GUIDE
TO THE REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS, at
http://lvwv.sec.gov/divisionslmarketreglbdguide.htm [hereinafter SEC GUIDE] (last
visited Aug. 22, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
73. Being a registered broker-dealer submits a company to regulation by the SEC.
SEC GUIDE, supra note 72.
74. Alexander C. Dill, Broker-Dealer Regulation Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: The Case of Independent Contracting, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 189, 217. For
specific rules and regulations, see 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78o, 78q(a)-(b) (West 1997 & Supp.
2001); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (2001).
75. Dill, supra note 74, at 217.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 207.
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SEC requires certain safeguards to assure that customers can recover
securities in the event a broker-dealer becomes insolvent. 7s
In the broker-dealer context, Congress and the SEC use three
specific areas of regulation to provide the desired customer
protection.79 First, the SEC requires segregation of customer funds
and securities from the broker-dealer's own assets and inventory.80
Second, the SEC promulgated rule 15c3-1,81 which requires a broker-
dealer to maintain a minimum amount of net capital and prohibits
broker-dealers from incurring an aggregate indebtedness in excess of
1500% of its net capital." These two rules ensure that customers and
creditors of a broker-dealer are protected if the enterprise fails. 3
Additionally, the rules eliminate investor risk by prohibiting
financially unqualified entities from registering as broker-dealers.'
Third, Congress created an industry-wide fund to satisfy claims of
customers when a broker-dealer becomes insolvent.'5
The SEC regulations of broker-dealers are not only concerned
with financial responsibility; registered broker-dealers, including
FOLIOfrn are also subject to the SEC rules prohibiting fraud in
securities transactions.86  These antifraud provisions prohibit
misstatements or misleading omissions of material fact and fraudulent
or manipulative acts and practices in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities.87 The essence of the SEC's rules is that broker-
78. See HAZEN, supra note 12, at 461 (describing measures that the SEC takes to
assure a broker-dealer's solvency).
79. In addition to these requirements, the SEC also requires broker-dealers to submit
to examinations and inspections, register in the lost and stolen securities program, submit
to fingerprinting, and maintain information on affiliates that may impact the financial
condition of the broker-dealer. SEC GUIDE, supra note 72.
80. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-2, -3 (2001).
81. See Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2001); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, § 15(c)(3) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78o(c)(3) (1994)).
82. Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(i) (2001).
83. Michael P. Jamroz, The Net Capital Rule, 47 Bus. LAW. 863, 863 (1992) (outlining
the basic structure of the Net Capital Rule and describing its fundamental sections and
underlying policy considerations). The net capital rule requires broker-dealers to
"maintain sufficient liquid assets to enable it to liquidate," satisfying all customer claims,
without the need for formal proceedings. Id
84. Dill, supra note 74, at 218.
85. Securities Investors Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78aaa-78111 (West 1997
& Supp. 2001) (establishing the Securities Investor Protections Corporation (SIPC) and
the SIPC fund).
86. SEC GUIDE, supra note 72.
87. Id. The most notable rules are established under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
which is a broad provision prohibiting the use of any deceptive device in connection with a
purchase or sale of a security. Rules promulgated under section 10(b) require customer
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dealers should be prohibited from taking advantage of their superior
knowledge of the market.," The SEC may also curtail activities that
are "manipulative, deceptive, fraudulent or otherwise unlawful."89
Because the underlying stocks in folios are publicly traded and widely
known, the main regulatory issues deal with whether FOLIOfn is a
safe place to invest. Antifraud rules help to alleviate any concerns
that FOLIOfn's officers may be acting in their own best interests
rather than those of their customers.
The SEC broker-dealer requirements seem to make further
regulation of FOLIOfn, and similar web-based investment programs,
redundant and therefore unnecessary. If the company can buy back
the securities when its customers need cash, as the net capital rules
require, investors that purchase stocks from FOLIOfn in this fashion
face no additional risks. Because the underlying securities have
market value independent of FOLIOfn's program, registration under
the 1933 Act should not be required.
To determine whether FOLIOfn is offering a security, a court
will use analysis similar to that used in a case involving another
investment bundle. In 1985, the Second Circuit decided Gary Plastic
Packaging Corporation v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith.9"
In that case, the court held that bank certificates of deposit (CDs),
sold by Merrill Lynch, acting as an intermediary for its customers,
were securities even though CDs sold directly by banks are not
securities under the 1933 Act.91
confirmation, disclosure of credit terms, and restrict insider trading. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 §§ lOb-10, 10b-16, and 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-10, 240.10b-16, and
240.10b-5 (2001). Rule 10b-5 has been interpreted broadly by courts to prohibit more than
just fraud. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997) (holding that 10b-5
also covers insider-trading activities). In addition, the SEC may bring an action against a
broker-dealer for fraudulent activity under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. Securities
Exchange Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2001). Rules
promulgated under 17(a) generally require broker-dealers to treat their customers fairly.
Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1273-74,
1295 (1995) (noting courts have held that "by hanging up a shingle" and doing business as
a broker-dealer impliedly represents that the broker will treat customers fairly).
88. Karmel, supra note 87.
89. SEC GUIDE, supra note 72.
90. 756 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985).
91. Id. at 242. It should be noted that, according to Howey, the definition of a security
was supposed to be broad and ambiguous, giving courts wide discretion in making a
determination. See SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). Supreme Court precedent
thereby ensured that lower courts will always have some level of discretion when applying
the Howey test, even in a clear case. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 n.11
(1982).
2001]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In Gary Plastic, the Second Circuit focused on the common-
enterprise and promoter-efforts prongs of the Howey test.92 In
evaluating the common enterprise, the court stated that Merrill Lynch
established a common enterprise by investigating issuers, marketing
the CDs, and creating a secondary market for them.93 The court also
held that investors in this program relied on the efforts of the
program's promoter, Merrill Lynch.94 On behalf of its investors,
Merrill Lynch negotiated with the banks to get favorable interest
rates on the CDs.95 Also, Merrill Lynch's creation of a secondary
market tied the liquidity of the CDs to the financial solvency of
Merrill Lynch.96 If the secondary market did not exist, investors
would not have had the advantages of liquidity and capital
appreciation. 97 The court stated further that the success of the
program depended on Merrill Lynch's standing as an investment
power and its ability to negotiate with banks.9
After discussing the Howey test, the court inquired into the
existence of other regulatory law covering the program at issue.99 If
such laws exist, then holding that the investments were securities
would be a "double-coating" of regulation.1" The court stated that if
investors have no other protection, the court has a greater incentive
to view the investments as securities. 1 1 In Gary Plastics, banking law
92. Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 756 F.2d
230,240 (2d Cir. 1985).
93. Id.
94. Note that the Second Circuit did not apply a strict meaning to "solely" from the
efforts of others requirement. See id. (noting a "significant portion" of the investment
hinges on Merrill Lynch's expertise).
95. Id. For a more detailed description of how Merrill Lynch operated its program,
see Raphaela M. Giampiccolo, The Second Circuit Illuminates the Howey Investment
Contract Test's Impact on Novel Financing Instruments, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 1001, 1004-05
(1986).
96. Gary Plastic, 756 F.2d at 240.
97. Id.; see Jana M. Winograde, Classifying a Foreign Bank Certificate of Deposits as a
Security: The International Impact of Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, 4 B.U. INT'L L.
J. 451,464-65 (1986).
98. Gary Plastic, 756 F.2d at 240-41. Merrill Lynch's market power was the
distinguishing factor from the Supreme Court's holding in Marine Bank. Id. at 241.
99. Id. at 240-41.
100. Id. This holding is based on the Supreme Court's mandate in Marine Bank v.
Weaver. 455 U.S. 551, 552 (1982). The crux of Marine Bank is that when another federal
regulatory scheme protects investors and helps to eliminate the risk of loss, the need for
federal securities law protection disappears. Id. at 558-59.
101. Gary Plastic, at 240-41; see also J. Christopher Kojima, Product-Based Solutions to
Financial Innovation: The Promise and Danger of Applying Federal Securities Laws to
OTC Derivatives, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 259, 304 (1995) (stating that the Supreme Court has
held that an instrument otherwise meeting the Howey test is not a security if already
covered by another regulatory framework).
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did not regulate these investments, which created a regulatory gap.102
The court indicated that the possible lack of government control
weighed heavily in its determination that the CDs offered by Merrill
Lynch were investment contracts and therefore subject to the 1933
Act.103 Whether a regulatory gap exists, according to the Second
Circuit, appears to be the most important factor in determining if an
investment should be deemed a security and subject to SEC
regulations. 104 Even if an investment contract meets the definition of
a security, this threshold issue must be overcome before it becomes
subject to the 1933 Act.105
The main similarity of the program offered by Merrill Lynch in
Gary Plastic and the stock-baskets offered by FOLIOfn is that the
investment's liquidity depends on the ability of the seller to maintain
the program. If FOLIOfn becomes financially insolvent, investors
will not have a defined group of other investors willing to trade shares
in house (without going to the market) or to pool shares to make
market transactions feasible.0 6 Initial investors experience not only
the risk inherent in the stock market, but uncertainty about
FOLIOfn's ability to successfully use its system technology to
maintain a market for its customers. Inability to trade the investment
in the marketplace is the same problem Merrill Lynch's customers
would face if Merrill Lynch were no longer able to provide a
secondary market for the CDs it sold. 07 The argument that FOLIOfn
is selling a security just like Merrill Lynch in Gary Plastics can be
refuted, however. In Gary Plastics, the Court was not really
concerned with an investment power like Merrill Lynch becoming
insolvent, but with Merrill Lynch merely giving up on the program.0 8
There are major differences, however, between the CDs sold by
Merrill Lynch and the investments offered by FOLIOfn. First,
FOLIOfn's program does not exist solely because of its standing as an
102. Gary Plastic, 756 F.2d at 241-42 (noting that absent the securities laws, investors
in Merrill Lynch's program had no federal antifraud protection).
103. Id. Some experts have criticized the lack of other federal regulations requirement.
See Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of
"Security": The "Context" Clause, "Investment Contract" Analysis, and Their
Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 504-18 (1987).
104. Gary Plastic, 756 F.2d at 241 (stating that "a gap would exist ... that would strip
the investor of needed federal protection"). Without proper regulation, investors lack
federal protection against fraud and misrepresentation in the marketplace. Id.
105. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
106. See McGeehan, supra note 7 (describing FOLIOfn's trading strategy).
107. See Winograde, supra note 97, at 465.
108. Gary Plastic, 756 F.2d at 240 (noting Merrill Lynch customers were relying on the
implicit promise that Merrill Lynch would maintain marketing efforts).
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investment power.109 To the contrary, similar programs have emerged
in both Internet companies"O and more established investment
companies.m Packaging stocks into various baskets, therefore, does
not require any special market power or leverage.112  The program
can be provided by any broker-dealer with access to the software who
wishes to make it available to its customers.
Second, in Gary Plastic, Merrill Lynch not only monitored banks
selling CDs (to ensure their credit-worthiness), but also negotiated
interest rates directly with those banks.13 Investors relied on Merrill
Lynch's expertise, making its efforts the most important part of this
investment.11 4 FOLIOfn presents a different case. FOLIOfn does not
negotiate or monitor the companies in its folios. 15  Nor does
FOLIOfn provide much assistance to customers who create their own
folio."6 Furthermore, the Internet itself is interactive by nature. The
Internet allows investors to use companies like FOLIOfn to control
what stocks they wish to hold, what stocks they wish to trade, and
when they wish to trade them. 1 7
In conclusion, the protections of 1933 Act registration can be
guaranteed without holding that FOLIOfn is offering a security. The
purposes of the 1933 Act are twofold: to provide full and fair
disclosure of securities sold in interstate commerce, and to protect
investors from fraudulent securities practices." 8 The broker-dealer
109. This is in contrast to Merrill Lynch's market strength in Gary Plastic. Here,
Merrill Lynch took an investment that must be held normally until maturity and made it
freely tradable and therefore, redeemable before that date. Gary Plastic, 756 F.2d at 240;
see Winograde, supra note 97, at 465.
110. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
111. Fidelity Investments and Charles Schwab are both in the process of offering stock-
baskets. Damato, supra note 5.
112. Furthermore, the packaging of stocks into bundles by Internet broker-dealers
does not change the fundamental nature of the investment, unlike Merrill Lynch in Gary
Plastic. See Winograde, supra note 97, at 465.
113. Gary Plastic, 756 F.2d at 240-41.
114. Id.
115. FOLIOfn simply makes publicly traded stocks already available in the
marketplace available in a different format. See Damato, supra note 5 (describing
FOLIOfn's product as a personalized fund product consisting of an assortment of U.S.
stocks).
116. Id (noting investors may construct folios "on their own or with considerable
assistance").
117. ICI Memo, supra note 16; see also Gaston F. Ceron, How Technology Changed
the Way We... Invest in Stocks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2000, at R32 (describing the effects
of online trading on investing).
118. Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a (West 1997 & Supp. 2001)); Gary Plastic, 756 F.2d at 237;
David B. Guenther, The Limited Public Offer in German and U.S. Securities Law: A
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regulations act in a way that eliminates any liquidity problems created
by FOLIOfn's structure. Since those are the only real "1933 Act
disclosure" concerns uncovered by the Howey analysis-all the
necessary disclosure is given by the registration and regulation of the
underlying stocks that compose an investor's folio.
Investors are also protected from any possible fraudulent activity
by FOLIOfn or other web-based investment programs when broker-
dealers run the programs. Therefore, further requirements placed on
these types of investment programs will not serve any useful purpose
and result only in over-regulation. Excessive regulation can often
raise the cost of doing business to prohibitive levels, thereby stopping
otherwise desirable business activity.119
Unnecessary 1933 Act registration is especially costly because of
its comprehensive disclosure requirements.2 ' These added costs
might cause FOLIOfn and other similar programs to reduce their
products available to customers.121 There is no reason to slow down
these types of innovative investment programs, which make securities
investment available to the general public.
RYAN L. BLAINE
Comparative Analysis of Prospectus Act Section 2(2) and Rule 505 of Regulation D, 20
MICH. J. INT'L L. 871, 898 (1999); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197,1209-10,1223-
26 (1999).
119. See Marshall B. Kapp, Health Care in the Marketplace: Implications for
Decisionally Impaired Consumers and Their Surrogates and Advocates, 24 S. ILL. U. LJ. 1,
29-30 (1999).
120. Michael McDonough, Death in One Act: The Case for Company Registration, 24
PEPP. L. REV. 563,595 (1997).
121. See id.
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